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Nonprofit Community Service and the Hidden Cost of
Information Technology
Roger. A. Lohmann, Ph.D.1
Nancy Lohmann, Ph.D.2
Will the information superhighway – like its concrete
counterpart, the interstate highway system – turn out to be a
good idea but too expensive to maintain properly? This paper
will explore issues associated with the initial and ongoing costs
of adopting information technology for nonprofit community
service organizations, with particular attention to access and
use of the information superhighway. Several possible
explanations for the lag in adoption of internet technology will
be explored. One of these will be the "null hypothesis" that
resources and services currently available over the internet may
still be insufficient to justify the costs involved for nonprofits.
The paper will also explore the issue of long-term costs for
nonprofits, by comparison with experiences in higher education.
Decision-makers in business and higher education are already
discovering that the initial startup costs of internet connection
may only be the tip of what is beginning to look like a very large
iceberg.

Introduction

Let us agree from the start that the "information superhighway" is an
interesting and evocative phrase, and that some of the ideas expressed under
that heading are thought-provoking while others are just plain silly. Some of
those ideas, such as those related to concepts of electronic democracy and
civic networks, for example, appear to have particular resonance with
traditional nonprofit/third sector concerns, while others, like "movies on
demand" have no obvious applicability. Let us also agree that present
implementations of some of these ideas in the form of the internet has
already taken a variety of interesting twists and turns which no one fully
anticipated and that further surprises are almost certainly in store for us in
the future. Finally, let us agree that – however the bill is to be paid, by whom
and over what period of time – the costs involved in creating an electronic
world are enormous. National Information Infrastructure (NII) proposals to
date have adopted a fundamentally commercial posture by which those costs
will ultimately be borne by information "consumers" in the form of various
competition-based user charges. Therefore, a key question – perhaps the key
question – regarding the nonprofit response to the internet, the information
superhighway and NII must be: What will it cost and what can we expect to
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get for the money? Behind the overwhelming enthusiasm of the past year,
the answer to those questions is still anything but clear for the third sector.

He Says, She Says
This paper is the product of an unlikely personal and professional union –
one which has lasted for more than 30 years. One of the co-authors of this
paper is a nonprofit researcher and theorist: A "lead user", "early adopter"
and unabashed advocate of the adoption of computer technology. He
designed, ordered, installed and has maintained for the past 10 years a Local
Area Network of approximately 25 workstations which has been hard-wired
to the internet for the past three years, via a campus backbone. He is, in
addition, a specialist in nonprofit financial management who is forced to
admit that cost and product-value considerations are becoming more, rather
than less, important for the nonprofit organization.
The other co-author is an academic administrator with primary
responsibility for managing the under-funded academic budget of a major
land-grant university; A consistently reluctant adopter but nonetheless
power user of computer technology, whose budget spreadsheets point toward
alarming and largely unanticipated increases in the costs of computing, and
who is frankly skeptical of the claims of computer advocates of major cost
savings from technology, and suspicious that innovative proposals
consistently understate the real costs involved until after the organization is
irreversibly committed.
Both authors agree that the adverse cost environment for universities and
other nonprofit organizations may ultimately force them into a kind of "tailwags-dog" posture if present trends continue: In the absence of large
amounts of new funding (of which there are no present signs), major cutbacks
in nontechnology spending (in controllable areas like personnel, and travel)
will eventually be necessary to compensate for continued technology
spending, regardless of whether the promised efficiencies from technology are,
in fact, real.
Once the networking initiatives are undertaken in an organization,
having the "latest and the greatest" often takes on such importance that all
other priorities are affected. At the same time, the kind of fiscally
irresponsible expectation of no limits – that we can have it all – is
encouraged.

Definitions
In order to pursue this issue, it is necessary to clarify a number of terms.
Nonprofit organization, in this paper, is used in its broadest sense. It refers to
any of the several hundred thousand nonprofit corporations, incorporated in
their respective states and exempted from federal corporate taxation by the
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Internal Revenue Service as well as an unknown number of similar
organizations not currently incorporated, recognized by the states or counted
by the IRS. In public affairs discussion, nonprofit organizations have also
traditionally included a broad range of public bureaux with very similar
profiles as domestic "nonprofit" service providers.
This entire broad universe of nonprofit organizations is characterized by
legal or ethical non-distribution constraints and generally falls along a
continuum defined by two polar types: At one end of the continuum are
nonprofit firms, engaged in tax-exempt production and distribution of various
services, but constrained by law and custom from disseminating profits to
stakeholders. Such firms may also be involved in some taxable or UBI
(unrelated business income) activities, without affecting their basic nonprofit
status. They may also be public funded, either through legislative
appropriations (in which case, we shall call them bureaux) or through grants
or service contracts. As their proportions of public revenues fall and contracts
for service grow colleges and universities, social service agencies, public
broadcasting stations and other nonprofit service providers are increasingly
finding themselves propelled in the direction of nonprofit firms.
At the opposite end of this continuum from nonprofit firms are commons
characterized by uncoerced participation, shared purposes, shared resources,
mutuality and indigenous norms of justice. Membership associations, selfhelp groups, social movements, political protest movements, religious
congregations, scientific and literary societies, and community foundations
are just a few of the many different types of commons which organize and are
recognized as nonprofits.
Community Service simply means that we are only primarily concerned
with "local" nonprofit organizations operating at the community, state or
regional level, and not with national or international organizations.
The term internet has several distinct meanings: In general, an internet
is a network of networks, while the Internet is a particular expression of
worldwide internets which arose in the wake of the Defense Department
ARPANet, and encompasses hundreds of thousands of local area networks,
thousands of wide area networks and a host of other difficult to describe
configurations.
For nonprofit organizations, the internet remains largely an enormous
dose of unproven potential. E-mail has proven that it's a marvelous
communications medium: a typing telephone for those in a largely verbal
culture who prefer to reflect and type rather than react and speak. It is useful
also for those in different time zones, for whom even the minimal
coordination of a phone-call can prove difficult. Certainly, before that
statistical and word processing software are clear cases where necessary but
time-consuming and error-prone tasks can be performed in a demonstrably
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superior manner. Desk-top publishing and laser printers have made possible
unprecedented levels of promotion and marketing of small nonprofits unable
to afford more expensive alternatives. Beyond that, however, the case gets
increasingly murky.
The cost of anything is ordinarily measured in one of two ways: Outlays
correspond most closely to purchase prices, and represent the amount paid or
"laid out" for a particular good or service. Although this is ordinarily an
adequate retrospective measure for detailing costs which have already been
incurred, when examining the future opportunity costs are a more
fundamental measure of the cost of an entity or objective in terms of the
alternatives given up in order to realize it (Crowell, 1976). Hidden costs are
those which are not revealed or apparent. In the case of the opportunity costs
of network technology adoption at least two distinct classes of hidden costs
should be distinguished: Overlooked costs can easily result from excessive
enthusiasm, inadequate planning, poor quality consultant information, and
other sources, including deliberate attempts to understate the costs of a
project. Many a networking project has doubled in cost when someone
discovered that the original estimates did not include the cost of copper
wiring, or routers or software.
Also, important hidden costs which are particularly important in the
adoption of new technology are discovery costs – which cannot, in principle, be
known ahead of time. After all of the hoopla over the "paperless office" (which
occurred roughly between the first wave of desktop computers and the
introduction of laser printers), many a nonprofit budget manager must have
been chagrined at what actually happened to paper costs. Instead of being
paperless, most offices have found themselves in an unprecedented deluge of
paper flow, most of it well-printed and attractive, but still clearly (and costly!)
paper. The laser printer was a genuinely new development, and it would have
been impossible in principle to predict its cost (or any other) implications
with any degree of accuracy. The full cost of laser printing in any office is not
simply equipment, electricity and toner, but also the large (and increasing)
quantities of paper consumed, and ultimately the additional time which
employees must put into reading that additional print-output.
The hidden cost questions posed by the information superhighway should
be potentially uncomfortable ones for nonprofit organizations: The key
question is the opportunity cost involved: although no one can tell you what
the full cost of networking technology will be, what will you be willing to give
up in order to have this resource? The usual answer being posed in the
nonprofit world is that cost reductions will, in some unspecified way, offset
the costs of acquisition, maintenance and operations of network capabilities.
It may also be noted that, in any case, the costs are expected to be
outweighed by the benefits. This optimistic scenario is very good for
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technology sales. It remains to be seen what its implications will be for
nonprofit services.

The Quest for Killer Aps
Current debate over the information superhighway resembles in certain
uncomfortable aspects debate in the late 1950's over the other superhighway –
the interstate highway system. Clearly there will be public funding involved at
some point. Just as clearly, those public funds will eventually show up in a
variety of corporate bottom lines. What is less clear at the moment is what the
benefits of internet connection will be for the nonprofit world.
Over the past year or two, the WWW browser Mosaic (and more recently
Netscape) has been described as the first "killer app" for the internet. In computer
jargon, "killer aps" or "killer" applications are software or applications which is
what Steve Jobs used to call "insanely great." For writers, word processing has
clearly proven to be such a killer app: Does anyone know anyone who, after a
fair trial, has forsaken their word processor and returned to a manual
typewriter? If so, that person is certainly an exception. Word processing has
clearly established itself as one of the most profound innovations in the history of
writing. Postscript, spreadsheets, and desktop publishing software are other
obvious killer apps.
The important question is whether web browsers, or any other network
application yet developed (including e-mail, FTP (file transfer protocol) software,
remote access, and others) truly constitutes this kind of intuitive, sensible
solution to real problems for nonprofit organizations. The entertainment value of
"cruising the internet" with Mosaic or Netscape is clear. Likewise, the potential for
faster and greater access to certain types of information is clear – but is
dependent upon greater quantities of such information actually becoming
available.
In higher education the question is somewhat clearer: The case for email is
much stronger, for example, for research-oriented faculty who are able to keep in
touch with others in their research specialty anywhere in the world, than it is for
those faculty whose only orientation is to the classroom and their students. Online or electronic publication is also opening up interesting new possibilities for
faculty hard pressed to publish. For administrators, already bombarded with
information from many directions, the cost of email access may far outweigh any
possible benefits; to reach an administrator, phone and leave a voice mail
message, or send a fax.
In a similar vein, it is not at all clear exactly what benefits may accrue to a
nonprofit community service from internet access. The immediate question of
greatest concern here is whether those benefits will outweigh the opportunity
costs of that access. Raising this question should not be taken as some type of
blanket opposition. It does however raise an obvious, and potentially painful,
issue which nonprofit boards, executive and staff members can ill afford to
ignore.
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A Tragedy of the Commons?
A second, related, question is whether the current stampede to internet
access, even by those who have no obvious or socially desirable reason to use
it will, in the end create the kinds of enormous traffic jams which make
freeway travel frustrating and counterproductive at certain times of the day
and year. To ignore this question is surely to risk a potential "tragedy of the
commons." The biologist Garrett Hardin used this phrase in the 1960's to
highlight environmental problems of overutilization: Like the medieval
common pastures whose grass is supposedly killed when too many farmers
graze too many sheep there, resources which are perceived as free to
everyone can under certain circumstances be overutilized, and in the process,
destroyed.

The Technology Cost Profile
The absence of detailed cost studies of nonprofit technology adoption
makes fertile ground for speculation. It is our view that it may be desirable
for nonprofit managers to think of technology costs as distinct from other
capital or equipment costs. Technology costs may appear initially to resemble
the cost of land, buildings, or equipment, with the major cost in the initial
purchase, with minor or incidental later costs associated with maintenance,
periodic repair and eventual replacement. In fact, however, technology costs
may behave more like personnel costs: Maintenance and repair costs may be
sufficiently high, and replacement sufficiently frequent that they may be
treated, for all intents and purposes, as consistent recurring costs. Everyone
who has migrated from an original IBM-PC or "Trash 80" to a 286 and then
to a 486, or from a MacPlus to a IIci and then to a PowerPC has followed this
cost profile closely. The same is true of software use.

An "Iron Law" of Nonprofit Technology Adoption?
Nonprofit organizations have been struggling – not very successfully – to
catch up and then to keep up with the rate of technology adoption in business
and higher education – two generally acknowledged leaders in this area. In
this milieu, the outlay costs of equipment acquisition have appeared to act as
the only major constraint upon adoption. Longer-term consideration of the
hidden costs of training, maintenance, up-grading and other costs have not
always been carefully considered. It is extremely difficult to make reasonable
policy in this context, because of the many unknowns. Employees using their
computers to play games or entertain themselves on the job are ordinarily
assumed to be the exception and not the rule. Nonprofit computer use is
expected to allow conventional work to be done more quickly and easily, and
the same number of workers to do more or fewer workers will be necessary to
do the same work.
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Despite the dramatic movement to revenue-metered community service
delivery in the past two decades, many nonprofit community services still
operate in a relatively fixed-budget environment. Decision-makers assume
they will have a fixed (if unknown) amount to spend in any given fiscal period
and operate by adjusting their expenditures to that amount. As one example
of this, the United Way in most communities, for example, still allocates on
fixed-budget assumptions. Public purchase of service contracts also often
include fixed ceiling as well as contracted fee rates.
At the same time, there are real and severe limitations on the ability of
administrators in many settings to dramatically increase revenues or
decrease costs. An administrator with most funds committed to full-time
salaries, for example, may be able to adjust spending in any significant way
only by laying off employees. Yet, in a fixed budget environment, it is a
certainty that escalating costs in one area – i.e., information technology– will
necessitate cutbacks in other areas.
This brings us to what appears to be an "Iron Law" of technology adoption
in nonprofit settings: Because most nonprofit organizations are heavily
service oriented, and because their abilities to increase revenues to offset
increased costs are limited, at some point the added costs of technology must
begin to compete with other costs. Thus, technology which does not result in
bone fide economies of scale or scope for the organization – allowing workers
to perform services more efficiently, or to perform a broader scope of services
in the same time – must inevitably diminish the ability of the organization to
perform its primary function.

Unheralded Costs and Contributions
It is worth noting also that the analogue between higher education and
other nonprofit activities is apt in a number of ways as the following three
examples show. Two lessons to be learned from higher education, for
example, are the tremendous importance of unheralded volunteer labor in
designing, creating, and maintaining local area networks, and also in setting
policy and following through on implementation. University administrations
did not generally lead their institutions into the adoption of desktop
computing nor the more recent enthusiasm for the internet; in many
instances central administrators have been the last, and most reluctant
adopters. Many centralized academic computing departments, wedded to a
world of mainframes and dumb terminals, vigorously resisted the "anarchy"
of PC's, LAN's and distributed processing. Although it is seldom remarked
upon, the "computer revolution" in higher education was a revolution-frombelow, planned and carried out by faculty, professional staff and enterprising
graduate students, with important leadership from computer science, physics
and engineering, but also plenty of contributions as well from the English,
Social Work and Education departments and others across the campus.
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The initial waves of this revolution were financed largely out of
departmental funds, external grants and the unsupported volunteer labor of
this cadre of unheralded faculty volunteers. Only later did the official budget
process come into play. One of the challenges potentially facing many
campuses today is the high-tech version of volunteer burnout. After years of
the kind of tinkering which originally set up and has maintained these
networks, at least some of these volunteers may be getting bored and
frustrated with the manner in which their units have come to depend on their
expertise and labor without sufficiently acknowledging or rewarding their
efforts. How can units be expected to acknowledge or reward what, in many
instances, they don't even recognize or understand? Any loss of these
volunteers, however, may create a "technology gap" leaving units vulnerable
to even such simple malfunctions as a faulty toner cartridge in a printer or to
unanticipated staff support demands to replace volunteers with a paid
position.
Where they continue to function, these volunteers may also create a kind
of alternative decision-making structure, capable of either supplanting or
subverting the official structure. On many campuses in the past year, for
example, many directors of computing must have had to scramble to reassert
their authority after ad hoc committees of faculty and/or staff began
designing or creating their own institution-level World Wide Web home
pages. Central coordination was needed over diverse departmental, college
and program efforts.
The volunteer phenomenon in campus networking has had several other
major impacts, both salutary and undesirable from a cost-management
standpoint. On the positive side, this independent can-do spirit – closely
identified with The American Way for many of us in the third sector – has
resulted in donations of literally thousands of hours of volunteer labor every
year from faculty and staff members who design, plan, implement and
maintain local computer systems while holding up their regular positions (or,
at least attempting to, in some cases).
This has also resulted in the growth of a substantial barter system on
many campuses, much like the military: "I'll trade you three memory chips
for that modem card", etc. This barter system probably makes more effective
use of much equipment, wiring, etc. than would otherwise be the case. At
times, it also creates nightmares for those administrators concerned with
inventory control and protection of institutional property.
The less desirable aspect of the volunteer labor phenomenon has been that
these same people have – in the course of those volunteer activities –
frequently have to make a variety of incidental purchases of everything from
SCSI terminators and cabling of all sorts to network software upgrades. In
many cases this has left the door open to administrators with budget
authority to be less than careful in monitoring these activities and/or lead
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users to be less than completely candid in presenting their requests. When
this occurred, de facto spending authority over major portions of already tight
budgets can in-effect be transferred to the lead users. Since the enthusiasm of
these volunteers will, presumably, be translated into computer-related
purchases, and not books for the library, conference travel or even other
equipment purchases (videotape equipment, for example), a unit's
discretionary spending can be (and has been) markedly skewed in this rather
simple manner.

The Cost of Underestimating Costs
At the institutional level, the impact of understating the true costs of
technology, whether done intentionally or unintentionally can be devastating.
In one case we are aware of, a decision to introduce a new system of course
scheduling software was made and publicly announced on the basis of a price
estimate for the software ($00,000).
Only after it had been announced and received widespread favorable
comment from students and faculty was it revealed/learned that the software
would also require a dedicated server on which to run ($400,000),
workstations with which to access the system (another $400,000), full-time
personnel to get the system up and keep it running (at least $80,000), and
additional personnel not fully dedicated to the project but spending
substantial amounts of time with it (another $80,000), as well as temporary
personnel to bring the program up ($110,000 for the first year) and the ongoing cost of consultants. Thus, what looked like a software bargain, actually
wound up costing the organization over a million dollars, including nearly
$200,000 in on-going personnel commitments.
None of these costs were part of the original estimate, and no special or
dedicated funds were available for this purpose. As a result, decision-makers
were faced with the classic rock-and-hard-place choice of simply absorbing
this amount in the on-going operating budget or face a hostile public reaction
to the apparent reversal of a popular, and seemingly sensible decision.
Unfortunately, absorbing this cost could only be done by delaying or denying
other worthwhile objectives.
A second, and similar, example involved a board-of-trustees initiative to
create electronically equipped classrooms. These classrooms were to contain
network links, interactive video capabilities, and a variety of other high-tech
features. Unfortunately, because it was seemingly a capital improvement
project, the RFP left no place for staffing to implement the program. It was
apparently assumed, without sufficient investigation either that all of the
necessary hardware and software was self-operating, or that classroom
instructors would operate it. There was no indication that additional software
would be required to implement the program. There was no indication that
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classroom renovations in addition to those needed and paid for by the project
would be required.
The larger the organization, of course, the larger its ability to absorb such
problems. In the case of a small nonprofit community service, even an
oversight of this type of $5,000 could be catastrophic. Yet the problem
remains, regardless of the scale at which it is acted out.
Another difficulty in this area is that people are often far harder to change
than hardware. Thus, even well-planned central actions may have
unanticipated implications. When a central budget and financial reporting
system on one campus was announced several years ago, for example, it was
indicated that only "IBM-compatible" (at that time, MS-DOS) systems would
be able to access it. In the meantime, Windows and the Apple compatibility
thrust came alone. This meant that by the time the system was actually up,
only a minority of users were accessing it from DOS, and that Macintosh
users also had no difficulty accessing it. Yet a number of Macintosh oriented
departments have been slow to adopt and use the system because of the
lingering impression that it is not accessible to them, and at least one
Macintosh program has installed a dedicated Windows system for the sole
purpose of accessing this system.

The Information Criterion
The growth of information-sharing on the internet has, and will continue,
to raise a host of complex, difficult and in some cases, unprecedented, issues
regarding the ownership, use and control of information. Although it is not
the defining characteristic, the types of information nonprofit organizations
possess, and what they choose to do with that information are major factors
in locating them on the continuum from commercialism to mutuality. In the
nonprofit world as elsewhere, information is a unique and complex
commodity with major philosophical and legal nuances: it lacks materiality,
and thus often lacks the kind of exclusivity upon which fundamental
doctrines of property ownership are based. The issue of who "owns"
information is often not an easy one to settle. Information can be held, sold or
given away, like any commodity. However, unlike material commodities,
when it is sold or given away the use of information may not as a result be
lost to the original holder. Instead, there is frequently a kind of contagion
effect: Now both the original holder and the recipient "know" and if they tell
others, who tell others, eventually everyone will know! Even when
information is given material form, as in printed pages or electronic data
files, its lack of exclusivity is not necessarily lost.
Certain types of information are, inherently public goods, in the dual
economic and political sense that they are indivisible and irretrievably "in"
the public domain. Public information may be sold once, but from that point
on it uncontrollably enters the public domain: News of Paul Revere's ride,
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the discovery of the Americas and that a human actually walked on the moon
are such cases. Other types of information are inherently saleable private
goods, often as much because of immediacy and novelty as exclusivity:
Minute-by-minute stock quotations from a month ago have very little market
value in any information market. Although they may be quite valuable to a
prosecutor seeking evidence of illegal manipulations or to a historian, such
secondary value is quite limited.

The Buttermilk Theory of Information
In a well-known definition in economic theory, Ronald Coase (1952) once
described firms as "islands of conscious coordination floating in a sea of
market relations like lumps in buttermilk." In using this metaphor, Coase
was attempting to transcend a rather obvious and embarrassing gap in the
logic of microeconomic theory: If the world is made up of uncoordinated
aggregates of competing producers and consumers operating along price
vectors, how is the coordinated activity of complex economic organizations
like factories and corporations to be explained as anything other than
economic irrationalities? The buttermilk analogy, of course, describes far
more than it explains, but it has proven useful none-the-less as a metaphor of
a deeper and more esoteric explanation. It is of immediate interest here
because it is also, indirectly, a factor in rationalizing the notion of nonprofit
organizations as a rather peculiar species of firm.
What binds the "lumps" (whether commercial firms or nonprofit
organizations) and sets them apart from their suppliers and competitors is, of
course, not a physical or chemical process, as in the case of real buttermilk,
but the social process which Coase called "coordination." The term
coordination also happens to be a fashionable buzz-word in nonprofit circles.
The term coordination became popular among neo-conservative nonprofit
theorists in part because the earlier term used by the institutional
economists – cooperation – had acquired a kind of leftist, socialist connotation
for many of them. So, coordination filled the void.
We wish to suggest here that it is, in fact, information which binds the
various lumps of organization together in market firms and nonprofit
organizations. Information, in the context of coordination may be a factor of
production – raw material, as it were, in the production of goods and services
or products. A key example of information as a factor is the technology (or
"know-how") which defines and makes sense of production processes: You
may have all the raw materials for mixing auto paint which will stick to
metal and remain bright through various weather conditions, but information
on how to mix them properly is the key ingredient without which the raw
materials are useless. In the context of the modern economy, information
may also be a commodity in itself. How else can we better describe modern
banking based as it is on electronic funds transfer? Indeed, the major
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question hovering over the many different discussions of the information
superhighway concepts today is how, and in what forms, information will be
marketed and sold electronically.
Coase's use of coordination in the buttermilk analogy, unlike some
contemporary uses in the nonprofit sector, points to an explicitly market
context and meaning. In this context, coordination might thus be defined as
mutually adaptive relations for purposes of shared gain. Economists are, for
the most part, good Hobbesian – seeing life generally as "solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short.” Much of the impact, if not always the intent, of nonprofit
economics has been to bring this "realistic" Hobbesian view to bear on a field
which has too often suffered from the opposite distortion of raging
Pollyannaism.
From a nonprofit (and somewhat more optimistic) view point, it is possible
to suggest that coordination and cooperation are in fact two ends of an
extensive continuum of possibilities, and that it is the manner of sharing
information which differentiates them: At one end of the continuum is purely
competitive coordination, in which information-sharing is always and only
based solely on demonstrable mutual advantage. At the opposite end of the
same continuum is pure cooperation, in which mutual advantage is not an
issue and unreserved sharing of information is always and only based on full
trust and mutuality and the absence of calculated advantage.
Both ends of this continuum are, of course, ideal types. The calculated
lumps in Coase's buttermilk correspond closely with the perspective of
microeconomics as it has come to be applied to the nonprofit sector, and the
mushy lumps of trust at the other end of the continuum correspond just as
closely with the perspective outlined in the theory of the commons. For most
existing nonprofit organizations, reality is generally to be found somewhere
along the continuum, with different organizations placing themselves at
different points through their information handling practices.

Revenue, Cost & Balanced Centers
One way to begin to think about the problems of controlling the costs of
information technology in nonprofit settings would be to begin to apply
conventional cost analysis frameworks. Conventional models of cost
accounting and cost analysis rely heavily upon the idea of centers, which in
the nonprofit world corresponds to some degree with the accounting concept
of funds. For purposes of "constructing" or determining costs, these centers
are the magnets to which are attached relevant or appropriate costs, and as
appropriate, revenues. As a further refinement of the basic concept, cost
centers are those in which the total costs attached to the center exceed
attached revenues. In the nonprofit setting, service programs not funded by
fees or user charges operate as cost centers. Conversely, revenue centers are
those in which a surplus remains after costs are subtracted from revenues. In
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the nonprofit organization, fund-raising operations are always intended to be
revenue centers. In the contemporary non-profit organizations some centers
are designated by a third classification which we are calling balance (or
break-even) centers. These are centers which are sometimes described as
having to carry their own weight: to generate enough revenues to offset their
costs. Thus, many colleges and universities have moved to designating a
variety of revenue, cost and balanced centers. Dormitories, book stores,
cafeterias and recreational facilities of various types, from bowling alleys to
concert programs may be targeted as revenue centers. A host of additional
activities, from continuing education to swimming pools and tennis courts
may be expected to carry their own weight and generate revenues sufficient
to offset their costs.

Information in the Third Sector: A Modular View
Any of these centers can exist as modular subsets of the same or other
centers. Thus, in most major universities the entire athletic program may be
a break-even center, while the revenue sports – football and basketball are
treated as revenue centers, which must generate enough to cover not only
their own costs but also those of the "non-revenue" sports, which function as
cost-centers. Indeed, the entire third sector can be seen from this vantage
point as a kind of enormous and complex balanced "superfund" of
hierarchically clustered networks of cost, revenue and balanced funds.
The specific questions which this raises for any given nonprofit
organization (itself, legally a balanced center) is whether it can identify its
major information cost centers and whether it possesses any real or potential
revenue centers which can be used to offset those costs.

Expenses and Recoveries
A fundamental consideration in the issue of assessing the costs of technology
for nonprofit organizations is the ability of the particular nonprofit to recover
costs associated with technology adoption. If the particular nonprofit
organization is partially or fully revenue-based, it may be possible to pass the
costs of technology adoption along to consumers of services in the form of higher
fees or charges. If the organization is not revenue based, or if its ability to raise or
adjust fees is severely limited (as in the case of many membership organizations
or third-party contracts), its cost-recovery ability may be severely limited.
Part of this is an issue of accounting; Nonprofit organizations do not
ordinarily reconstruct the "cost of doing business" as a charge against gross
revenues. An exception to this, perhaps, may be those "revenue centers” which
are expected to carry their own weight and particularly those liable for unrelated
business income taxes.
As a result, the costs of technology are almost always "sunk costs" – outlays
from existing or anticipated revenues for which there will be no direct or
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realizable offsets in increased revenues. Raising tuitions for students, or raising
fees for clients, (or, at least, decreasing real marginal surpluses) may be a
necessary step to finance

One-time or Recurring Costs?
It is tempting to see the costs of technology adoption as one-time capital
purchases: Decide what you need, get the best price and buy it! Simple. Over
the past decade, many nonprofit organizations have pursued exactly this
strategy: Requesting "one-time" grants or budget allocations from funding
authorities, or enacting one-time fee increases.
Unfortunately, for a host of reasons, it is becoming increasingly clear that
this approach may not be sufficient. Technology costs appear to function a
good deal more like such recurring costs as personnel than like the one-time
cost of single purchases. First of all, it is nearly impossible under many
circumstances to fully anticipate all of the costs associated with such
purchases.
Even relatively simple purchases like desk-top computers may bring a
host of possible additional costs: Are all of the necessary cables and
connectors included? Is additional RAM memory needed/desired? Does the
unit come with a printer or is that extra? Modem? Networking connectors?
Another rule of thumb is probably that you can never have too much
software: Software also brings with it the built-in problem of the continuous
incremental costs of upgrading:
Most significant of all, there is the continued technological obsolescence
associated with the bone fide advancement of technology of the past decade?
Who could seriously argue today, in the world of Pentium and the PowerPC
that a 68000-based Macintosh or a 286 Intel machine offers a sufficient
standard of performance for all but the most basic tasks?
The advent during the past decade of laser printing, first for the
Macintosh and later in the Intel- world immediately rendered thousands of
dot-matrix and daisy-wheel printers substandard. Likewise, somewhere on
back shelves and inventory rooms are thousands of 300-, 1200-, 2400- and a
growing number of 9600-baud modems, perfectly usable but replaced by
newer, faster models.
The full costs of technology are often underestimated, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, by those attempting to persuade
administrators to invest in their proposals. The reasons for this are not at all
difficult to fathom: On the one hand, the full cost of a proposal may be
purposively understated out of fear or concern that
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Paying For It Out of The 'Ouskeeping
The approach of many nonprofits to the problems discussed here is
somewhat like that expressed in one of Peter Seller's Inspector Clouseau/Pink
Panther movies. Faced in court with the question of how his wife (who is secretly
a confederate of the jewel thief) is able to afford her jewels and furs on a police
inspector's meagre salary, Clouseau responds feebly, "She said she saved it out of
the 'ouskeeping allowance!" Many nonprofit organizations are in a similarly
absurd position of having to try to finance major capital expenditures for
equipment, wiring, cable, routers, drivers, and other necessities out of operating
funds.

Conclusion
So where does all this lead? Will the National Information Infrastructure end
up underfunded and undermaintained like the nation's "superhighways" and rail
lines, or the telephone systems in the Soviet Union and third world countries?
-

-

Will present patterns of commitment by default be extended from higher
education to other nonprofit settings?
Will uncontrolled growth of spending for information technology serve, in
the long run to undermine the ability of higher education to perform its
traditional mission of teaching, research and service? We cannot say with
certainty that it will. However, the question is far more worthy of serious
consideration than it might at first appear.
Will both the positive and the unfortunate sides of volunteer labor which
have characterized higher education eventually be found also in other
nonprofit organizations? We believe that they will.
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